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State University of New York, Buffalo
ABSTRACT
In an attempt to protect their intellectual property and compete effectively in an increasingly dynamic
marketplace, software producers have employed a number of preventive and deterrent measures to counter
software piracy. Conventional wisdom suggests that reducing piracy will force consumers to legitimately
acquire software, thus increasing firm profits. In this paper, we develop an analytical model, using
Buchanan's economic theory of clubs, to test the implications of anti-piracy measures on producer profits.
Our results suggest that deterrent measures can potentially increase profits. Empirical results are also
presented which support the assumptions of the analytical model.
1. INTRODUCTION Preventive measures use technology to increase the costs of
engaging in acts of piracy. Such measures, often referred
The effect of piracy on firm performance is a central to as front-end strategies, are usually undertaken through
economic question facing the software publishing industry. hardware-based or software-based copy protection schemes
Estimates on the dollar amount of pirated software reach as (Valigra 1985). Examples of hardware-based protection
high as $4 billion (Zagorsky 1990). Because software has methods include nonstandard disks, Coder cards, and
the characteristics of a public good where the consumption hardware locks (Morgon and Ruskell 1987). Software-
utility of unit derived by an individual is not reduced by based protection methods are employed by embedding
sharing with others, the typical market dynamics of exclu- special codes in the software that make copying more
sivity do not come into play. Therefore those who do not difficult for the users (Morgon and Ruskell 1987). Addi-
pay directly for a public good can still consume it and tional preventive strategies include providing customer
receive the accompanying benefits. Software is very much support only to registered users and having documentation
like art in a museum or a public park, even though it is which is difficult to duplicate. The objective of preventive
classified as a private good which is produced for commer- measures is to increase the costs associated with using
cial purposes. pirated software.
Software publishers, iii the face of an increasingly competi- Deterrent measures, in contrast to preventive measures, do
live marketplace, have employed anti-piracy technologies not directly increase the cost of pirating software. Deter-
and legal and educational campaigns as a way to protect rent measures, often referred to as back-end strategies,
their intellectual property. The objective of these strategies attempt to dissuade users from copying software by dissem-
is to reduce the size of software piracy clubs. The effect of inating litigious information about software piracy. In
these strategies on reducing the size of the software piracy addition to distributing information concerning the illegality
clubs and the ensuing effect on the economic performance of software pirating, software companies also distribute
of software publishers is the subject of this paper. information on the effect of piracy on new software devel-
opment. These measures are usually employed through
educational, investigative and legal campaigns (Fuentebella
2. STRATEGIES TO COUNTER PIRACY 1989). Educational campaigns attempt to educate users
about copyright laws and inspire attitude changes about
Straub (1990) identified deterrent measures and preventive appropriate software copying behavior (Paolo 1991).
measures as the primary strategies for combating computer
hardware abuse. Similarly, preventive and deterrent stra- The Software Publishers Association (SPA), a commercial
legies have also been employed by software publishers to software watchdog group representing 565 software pub-
coutiter piracy. lishers, has recently taken to using billboard advertising to
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get the message across (Anonymous 1991), but it has also If we further assume that consumers are strict value maxi-
taken legal action against individuals and organizations who mizers, then it follows that search behavior should take
exhibit flagrant disregard for copyright law. For example, place to locate individuals to "share" in the cost of the
the SPA often conducts unannounced software audits of software. The resulting economic group has the character-
firms and files lawsuits against overt offenders of the law istics of what has been described as a private goods dub by
(Mason 1990). The intent of the informational, investiga- Buchanan and elaborated on by Sorenson, Tschirhart and
tive and legal campaigns is to draw attention to the fact that Whinston (1978).
everyone has legal, ethical, and social responsibilities
related to piracy behavior. The incentive for club formation lies in the decreasing cost
function affiliated with acquiring the software. One can
In the following section, an economic model is developed visualize a club consisting of a group of individuals who
and analyzed to determine the influence of preventive and purchase a software package and make copies of the
deterrent strategies for reducing piracy on the profitability software and relevant documentation for the club members.
of software publishers. Buchanan's (1965) economic Alternatively, a club need not be so formal. An individual
theory of clubs, where economic actors engage in consump- may give a copy of the software to a friend or a business
tion ownership arrangements, provides the theoretical associate with the implicit agreement that the friend or
foundation for modeling software piracy behavior. business associate reciprocate the transaction in the future
with some other software.
3. MODEL DEVELOPMENT There are, of course, additional costs associated with
belonging to a club. These include the cost of defeating
The fullowing discussion describes the mathematical foun- copy protection schemes, the opportunity costs of foregone
dations of an economic model for determining the effect of performance guarantees and access to customer support,
software protection strategies on software piracy and firm and the costs associated with duplicating documentation.
performance. Following the lead of Conner and Rumelt We assume that the average cost (AO to an individual in a
(1991) - for reasons of tractability and consistency - we club of size n is
assume that (1) the demand function for software is down- p
ward sloping and linear and (2) that marginal production AC = _ +c n (2)
costs are zero. The assumption that the demand curve for a n
particular software package slopes downward implies that
there are no substitute products available in the market. In the above expression, P is the market price of the
(Relaxing the substitutability restriction is an area for future original software package and cn represents the costs to
research.) The marginal production costs for a unit of defeat the preventive measures employed by the software
software are typically a small percentage of the total producer, where c is the additional cost to each member
production costs for software (less than five percent). The when an individual joins the club. Note that the average
cost for producing an additional unit of software is the sum cost to a club member to defeat the preventive measures is
of the costs for duplicating a diskette and the costs for cn, which is an increasing function of the club size.
printing the documentation. It follows then that the total Typically, software publishers provide customer support
cost to the software publisher for a package is simply the only to the individual who actually purchased the software.
fixed cost F for developing and marketing the software. Other members of the club have to direct their queries
through the legitimate member of the club. Congestion
As noted in the previous section, software publishers costs are the result of the increased traffic and ensuing
employ a variety of preventive measures (A) and deterrent inconvenience associated with larger club sizes.
measures (B) to reduce software piracy. It is assumed that
the degree to which preventive measures and deterrent We assume that the software publisher can increase conges-
measures are applied increases the fixed product costs, and tion costs by adopting stricter preventive measures in the
thus form of protection technologies. Thus we have
BC 20 (3)OF OF  20 ami 2 0 (1)-3X -35
For any given price of the software, the optimal club size is
It should be noted that software is not strictly a private reached when the average cost to a club member is at a
economic good. That is, the utility derived from con- minimum. Minimizing equation 2 results in an optimal
suming or using software is not affected if someone else club size n' of
makes a copy of the software, It is further assumed that
the utility derived when someone copies the software is not n' = (P/c)'/2 for P 2 c (4)
affected by the fact that it is a copy of the original. Thus,
the utility a consumer receives from using the software
does not depend on whether the software is an original or a Accordingly, the software producer can reduce the club size
pirated copy. by adopting stricter preventive measures. Note that the
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D 1/2
software club will cease to exist if the average cost to a ,/[B) 21. C (.5,0 - (1-4) )
club member exceeds the market price of the software. 2 c c
Substituting equation 4 into equation 2 and equating the
average cost to the price of the software leads to the first Using equations 2 and 5, the average cost of belonging to
observation. an optimal size club is
Observation 1: The software producer
can effec. AC = 2(Pc)Ul (7)
tively eliminate piracy through preventive measures ./[B)
by ensuring that
Assuming a linear demand function, the total number of
C> . individuals who would obtain a copy, Q is given by
4
Q=z-a 2(PC)'/2(1 +12(B)) (8)
Up to this point in the analysis, we modeled the club AB)
formation as a "legal and socially acceptable" activity,
But of course the unauthorized duplication of most com- Where a is the reduction in the demand per unit increase in
puter software is illegal. In the presence of copyright laws, price and z is the zero-price demand. The total number of
individuals may still participate in clubs because (a) they originals sold by the software publisher, Q„ is
are unaware of the legal aspects of pirating software, and/or
(b) they believe the chances of getting caught are minimal, Q. = f (9)
and/or (c) they perceive the consequences of getting caught
as minor.
The publisher's problem then is to choose the price which
From this discussion, an important question surfaces con- maximizes profits (70 as given by
cerning the effects of deterrent measures on club formation.
We assume that for given values of P and c, the optimal f=P·0-F (10)
size of the software club is inversely related to the deterrent
measures undertaken by the software publisher. Thus, we
reformulate equation 4 as follows Maximizing *, using equations 8, 9 and 10 we have
n• = CP)10 . 1 (5) p. m z2 0 7(B) (11) *222F (1 +AB))2
Where ./(B) is the effectiveness of the deterrent measures
and it satisfies the following properties. n. = z (12)
20Lc(1 +r(B))
BAB) 2 0 and ./[0) =1 (6)BB r = 21· 7(B) - F (13)
Where B=0 implies that the producer does not copyright 4(x (1 +7(B))
the software and thus does not undertake any deterrent
measures. where P' is the profit maximizing price, and n*and *' are
the corresponding club size and profiL To study the effects
Typically larger clubs are more easily detected than smaller of preventive and deterrent measures, we perform the
clubs (Benham and Wagner 1987) and thus the software comparative static analysis and derive the following propo-
producer may be able to actually cause smaller club sizes to sitions.
form through deterrent measures. The assumption that club
sizes can be controlled through deterrent measures is an Proposition 1: Increases in preventive and deterrent
important empirical question that will be tested in a later measures reduce the market price P.
section in this paper. ap.
Pro#· From equation 11, it is obvious that CO.
The software producer can reduce the club size and in some -32-
cases preclude their formation by adopting stricter deterrent ap. ap, Bc
measures. Substituting equation 5 into equation 2 and Using equation 3 we have -DI =-Flk 5 0.equating the average cost to price of the software leads to
the following observation:
Similarly from equation 11 we have,
Observation 2: The producer can effectively elimi- ap - 12 AB) (1-r(B)) ,*[B)nate piracy through deterrent measures by ensuring
that -3-- 2a'C (1 +7(B))2 --8
163
Since AB) 21 ami   20 (equation 6) , we have
• deterrent measures effectively reduce club size and
• the fixed costs of implementing the deterrent measuresap. £0. are not prohibitively high.-35-
The results suggest that market price of the software and
preventive/deterrent measures are substitute strategies. This 4. DISCUSSION
is consistent with the current strategies of the software
publishing industry where publishers charge higher prices to The model presents two interesting results. The first is that
compensate for revenues lost to pirates or they lower prices the price and the preventive/deterrent measures are substi-
and more stringently enforce anti-piracy programs (Carrol tute strategies. The second result is that while preventive
1986). and deterrent measures can both effectively eliminate
piracy, preventive measures have a negative effect on
Proposition 2: Increases in preventive measures profits while deterrent measures can potentially increase
reduce profits and increases in deterrent measures profits if they are effective in curtailing club formation and
may increase or decrease profits. the associated fixed costs are low.
Proot· From equations 1 and 13 we have There is some anecdotal evidence supporting these results.
0%. af Around 1985, a number of software companies started
CO (14) removing copy-protection devices on their software (Anto--3I '3X noff 1987). Coinciding with the removal of copy-protec-
tion technologies, the software publishers began active
From equation 13 we have educational and legislative campaigns (Mason 1990).
2%8) MB) BF Further anecdotal evidence for the model is the recent(15) phenomenon where software companies sell both a copy--35- - 2a (B) + 1) -3-- - = protected and an unprotected version of the same software
(Carrol 1986). The unprotected version sells ata higher
Equation 14 shows that increasing preventive measures price than the protected version.
reduces profits. In equation 15, the first and the second
terms on the right hand side are positive (equations 1 and As noted earlier, a critical assumption of the analytic model
6) and thus the profit may rise or fall depending on the presented is that deterrent measures decrease club size. In
magnitude of these two terms. The above results can be the next section, we report the results of a study conducted
explained as follows. The objective of undertaking preven- to determine if the deterrence assumption holds up to
tive and deterrent measures is not solely to reduce piracy empirical analysis.
but to appropriate a higher price from each member of the
software club. The price paid by each individual to the
software producer is P'/n'. From equations 11 and 12, we 5. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON SOFTWARE
have PIRACY
p· (16) As yet, the number of empirical studies related to software
n ' 20!(1 +7(B)) piracy is limited. Further, many of the studies on software
piracy have been primarily descriptive, reflecting the
From the above expression we have, relative newness of the topic. For example, Soloman and
O'Brien (1991) report that software piracy is widespread
KIP') among business students and that they view piracy as
(17) socially and ethically acceptable. Shim and Taylor (1991)
=0BA found that copying software is perceived by IS faculty
members as being more prevalent among IS faculty than
similar perceptions among business managers regarding
ad.) their employees, In another study Swinyard et al. (1990)
4 = 4/[8) 2 0
(18) found that Asians have a more casual attitude toward piracy
88 2a(1 +7(B))2
than Americans, and that Asian attitudes are rooted in
cultural mores which emphasize sharing creative work.
Through preventive measures the software producer cannot Particularly interesting at this stage of inquiry are studies
appropn'ate a higher price from a user, and thus the nega- that focus on the demographics and personality characteris-
tive effect on the profit. However, through deterrent ties of software pirates and the social and organizational
measures the software producer can appropriate a higher context of software piracy. Eining and Christensen (1991)
price from each user, and the net effect of these measures found that negative attitudes toward computers, individual
is positive (f the following conditions are in place (equation perceptions concerning the net benefits of piracy, and
15): personal norms were related to the amount of pirated
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software possessed by business students. Solomon and H2: Given an individual' s ethical index, providing
O'Brien found that females engage in less piracy and deterrence i*rmation will reduce the club size.
younger students pirate more software.
The expected behavior for the two hypotheses is illustrated
We also included an ethics construct in the main research in Figure 1. A formal representation of the hypotheses
study because several of the subjects in the pilot study follows.
commented on the obvious link between software piracy
and ethics. In reviewing the literature, we could find no Club Size = f(Deterrence information, Ethical Index)
studies that included a general measure of ethics in the
research model. This is indeed perplexing, because copying
software is illegal and studies on software piracy can be /\ I r.for'.t I enWIthout Deterrence
found in recent books on the ethical issues in information
systems (Dejoie, Fowler, and Paradice 1991). In addition, (1)
several studies refer to the ethical overtones of sof
tware N
piracy (Swinyard et al. 1990; Carrol 1986; Antonoff 1987).
As such, a general measure of ethical attitudes was in- (D
cluded as a control variable in the empirical analysis in
order to better assess the effect of the deterrent measures  




6. THE DETERRENCE ASSUMPTION
This study examines the effects of deterrent measures on an  
individual's propensity to pirate software by participating in Ethical Index
the formation of a software piracy club. The primary
objective of the research is to establish the theoretical
underpinnings for the economic model outlined earlier. In
most studies, software piracy is measured as a single item Figure 1. Expected Relationship among
score, usually by asking the respondents whether they copy Research Variables
software and how much they copy. We contend that
another important aspect of software piracy is the number 7. METHODOLOGY
of people willing to participate in a piracy transaction. It
was noted earlier that a club is formed when (1) a group of Club Size: Four items were used to operationalize the club
individuals purchase a software package and make copies size and they are shown in Table 1. The items describe
of the software and relevant documentation and (2) when hypothetical scenarios describing an individual making
there is an implicit agreement among individuals to engage illegal copies for himself or herself at home, for a family
in reciprocal pirating transactions. The number of indivi- member, for a friend, and for other colleagues. The sum of
duals participating in the club is defined as the club size the responses for the four items results in a measure of the
and, as demonstrated earlier, larger club sizes reduce the club size that the individual is willing to participate in. The
profitability of software publishers. A typical detenence scale was constructed so that higher values for the club size
approach employed by software publishers is the unfolding measure are associated with smaller club sizes.
of educational campaigns to provide users with information
regarding copyright laws and the consequences of breaking The club size measure is also reasonably reliable. Table 2
the law, Deterrent measures attempt to dissuade users from shows the correlations between the four items used to
copying software by informing them about the illegality of measure the club size. All of the four items are signifi-
software pirating. The purpose of educational campaigns is cantly correlated, indicating the existence of a single
to inform users about copyright laws and inspire attitude construct. We also performed an exploratory factor analy-
changes about appropriate software copying behavior. sis, the results of which also indicate the existence of a
single factor. Finally, Cronbach's coefficient Alpha for the
The thrust of this empirical research is to investigate the four club items is .80, indicating that the scale is fairly
validity of the deterrence assumption; however, we believe stable and consistent
that an individual's propensity to form a club is also
affected by the individual's ethical index. (The ethical Deterrence Information: This is a one page information
index is the ethical profile of an individual as represented sheet on software piracy (see Table 3). Deterrence infor-
by a single summative score obtained from a general ethics mation provided on the sheet included current copyright
questionnaire.) We hypothesize the following relationships: laws, the consequences of being caught for violating copy-
right laws, actions taken by the SPA to curtail piracy, and
Hl: An individual with a lower ethical index will the negative effects of software piracy on software firms
participate in larger club sizes: and users.
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Table 1. The Club Size Items*
1. Doug Watson is an architect at Architects Unlimited. He is working on a major consulting project for Architects
Unlimited. The timing and the completion of the project is critical, and he is committed to the project He recently
purchased an expensive copyrighted software which is essential to finish the project correctly and on time. He
anticipates working overtime, including weekends, to successfully complete the project. In order to provide easy access
to the software he makes a copy of the software, and installs the software at home and at work (mean = 2.16, standard
deviation = 0.982).
2. A close family member of Doug Watson is also an architect. During a holiday family get-together, the family member
comes to know about the software and asks to make a copy of the software. Doug Watson lets him make a copy of the
software (mean = 3.27, standard deviation = 1.17).
3. While Doug Watson is using the software at work at Architects Unlimited, one of his colleagues happens to pass by
and notices the new software. This person shows strong interest in making a copy of the software. Doug Watson lets
him make a copy of the software (mean = 3.16, standard deviation = 1.14).
4. The computer consultant at Architects Unlimited comes to know about the software. The consultant wants to keep a
copy of the software at the lab so that any employee at the company can copy and use the software. Doug Watson lets
the consultant make a copy of the software (mean = 3.63, standard deviation = 1.11).
+ Ratings for the items consisted of a five-point scale with steps varying from "Always Acceptable" to "Never
Acceptable.






* P < 0.0005
Ethical Index: These items were obtained from a scale of the sensitive nature of the topic, subjects were assured of
developed by Wood et al. (1988) to determine the ethical complete anonymity of their responses. There were 123
profile of business students. The ethical index is computed usable responses in the sample with 60 of the question-
by summing the responses to sixteen hypothetical situations naires containing the deterrence infornzation (see Table 3).
listed in Table 4. A higher scale value indicates higher
ethical values. The Cronbach coefficient Alpha value for
the sixteen scale items is .77, indicating that this scale is 8. RESULTS
reasonably stable and reliable.
The inter-item correlations for all of the research variables
The Sample: Two sets of questionnaires were developed. are found in Table 5. Regression analysis was performed
One questionnaire contained the one page sheet with with the club size as the dependent variable and ethical
deterrence information, the items for measuring club size, index and deterrence information as the independent vari-
and the items for determining the ethical index. The other ables. Deterrence information was coded as a dummy
set of questionnaires contained the same variables, with the variable, with 0 indicating that the respondents were not
exception of the deterrence information. Deterrence provided deterrence information. The results of the regres-
information is in effect a treatment. The questionnaires sion analysis are as follows (t-values for the coefficients are
were randomly distributed to 130 MBA students. Because in parentheses):2
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Table 3. Deterrence Information
Copyright Law and Computer Software
Computer software is copyprotected under US Code Section 17. The software producer has the exclusive right to make and distribute
copies of the software. When the user purchases the software, he or she is only buying the right to use the software. The program itself
remains the property of the software publisher. Most software packages come with a license agreement that restricts users from making
copies for purposes other than backups. Usually the license agreement prohibits the use of the software package on more than one
hardware device.
Penalties
Under federal law, unauthorized duplication of computer software carries both civil and criminal penalties. Any person infringing a
copyright may be fined up to $ 10.000 and/or imprisoned for up to one year.
Software publishers have taken a number of steps to deter piracy. The recently formed Software Publishers Association (SPA) performs
corporate audits. Specialized software is available to detect pirated copies of software in computer hard disks. While the audits are
voluntary, if a company refuses, the SPA will take it to court. The number of court cases has increased dramatically in the past few
years. SPA has stepped up its educational campaign to inform users about the copyright laws.
Impacts of Piracy
Software industry analysts argue that piracy is a huge drain on the software publishers' profits. They estimate that $ 170 million to $ 4
billion worth of software is pirated and it directly affects over 11,000 companies engaged in software development. Industry analysts pre-
dict that continued piracy will inhibit the development of new software as companies will not be able to recoup their software devel-
opment costs. Thus, piracy will not only affect the software companies but it will also affect users as new software will not be
developed.
Club size = -1.61 + 0235 Ethical Index + 131 Deterrence infonnation results suggest that preventive measures do not increase
measure (-0.832) (6.714*) (2.474*) producer profits while deterrent measures can have a
positive effect on profitability. Future areas for research
R2 (adjusted) = 0.28 R2 = 0.29 could involve:
The R2 value for the model and the F-value of 24.71 . Empirically validating the two propositions derived in
(significance value < .00005) indicate a good fit for the this paper.
research variables. The t-values for the independent vari-
ables are significant at the .05 level, thus providing strong • Further validation and refinement of the research
evidence for accepting the two research hypotheses. variables. For example, examining the relationship
Multicollinearity did not present a problem in fitting the between the club size construct and actual club forma-
model because the correlation between the two independent tion behavior.
variables was not significant (r =-0.059) as illustrated by
Table 5. These results also provide some evidence of the • Determining the durability of the deterrence treatment.
discriminant validity of the club size construct. In effect This should provide insight into the timing and inten-
providing subjects with deterrence information does not sity required to wage effective educational campaigns.
affect their ethical index. In contrast, providing deterrence
information does influence the subjects' propensity to form , Investigating the case where there are substitute pro-
software piracy clubs (r = 0.156*). In other words, club ducts available. Consider the case of two firms pro-
size responds to manipulation while the ethical index does ducing near substitutes. There may be incentives for
not respond. one producer to allow formation of larger software
clubs to attract consumers away from the other firm's
The results provide strong support for the critical economic product.assumption that deterrence information has a significant
effect on the club size.
• Investigate the role of piracy as an advertizing
9. CONCLUSIONS mechanism.
This paper has investigated the effects of preventive and • Additional investigation into the role of ethics in
deterrent measures on software producers' profits. The economic models.
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Table 4. Ethical Index Items+
1. An executive earning $50,000 a year padded his expense account by about $1,500 a year (mean = 3.87, standard deviation =
0.87).
2. In order to increase profits, a general manager used a production process which exceeded legal limits for environmental
pollution (mean = 4.59, standard deviation = 0.57).
3. Because of pressure from his brokerage firm, a stockbroker recommended a type of bond that he did not consider a good
investment (mean = 4.13, standard deviation = 0.69).
4. A small business received one-fourth of its gross revenue in the form of cash. The owner reported only one-half of the cash
receipts for income tax purposes (mean = 4.00, standard deviation = 0.94).
5. A company paid a $350,000 "consulting" fee to an official of a foreign country. In return, the official promised assistance in
obtaining a contract which should produce a $10 million profit for the contracting company (mean = 3.24, standard deviation =
1.10).
6. A company president found that a competitor had made an important scientific discovery that would sharply reduce the profits
of his own company. He then hired a key employee of the competitor in an attempt to learn the details of the discovery (mean
= 2.66, standard deviation = 1.02).
7. A highway building contractor deplored the chaotic bidding situation and cutthroat competition. He, therefore, reached an
understanding with other major contractors to permit bidding that would provide a reasonable profit (mean = 3.39, standard
deviation = 1.08).
8. A company president recognized that sending expensive Christmas gifts to purchasing agents might compromise their positions.
However, he continued the policy since it was common practice and changing it might result in loss of business (mean = 2.67,
standard deviation = 0.91).
9. A corporate director learned that his company intended to announce a stock split and increase its dividend. On the basis of this
information, he bought additional shares and sold them at a gain following the announcement (mean = 4.00, standard deviation
= 1.07).
10. A corporate executive promoted a loyal friend and competent manager to the position of divisional vice president in preference
to a better qualified manager with whom he had no close ties (mean = 3.36, standard deviation = 1.07).
11. An engineer discovered what he perceived to be a product design flaw that constituted a safety hazard. His company declined
to comct the flaw. The engineer decided to keep quiet rather than taking his complaint outside the company (mean = 4.07,
standard deviation = 0.78).
12. A controller selected a legal method of financial reporting that concealed some embarrassing financial facts that would
otherwise have become public knowledge (mean = 2.65, standard deviation = 1.13).
13. An employer received applications for a supervisor's position from two equally qualified applicants but hired the male applicant
because he thought that some employees might resent being supervised by a female (mean = 3.77, standard deviation = 1.12).
14. · As part of the marketing strategy for a product, the producer changed its color and marketed it as "new and improved," even
though its other characteristics were unchanged (mean = 3.30, standard deviation = 1.15).
15. A cigarette manufacturer launched a publicity campaign challenging new evidence from the Surgeon General's office that
cigarette smoking is harmful to the smoker's health (mean = 3.08, standard deviation = 1.14).
16. An owner of a small firm obtained a free copy of a copyrighted computer software program from a business friend rather than
spending $500 to obtain his own program from the software dealer (mean = 3.30, standard deviation = 1.14).
+ Ratings for the items consisted of a five-point scale with steps varying from "Always Acceptable" to "Never Acceptable."
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Table 5. Mean, Standard Deviation, and Correlations
Between the Research Variables
Mean Std. dev. Information Club size
Ethical Index 56.09 7.57 -0.059 0.5055*
Information 0.488 0.50 0.156*
Club size 12.16 3.45
* p < 0.0001
** p < 0.1
In response to the final observation, traditional economists Conner, K. R., and Rumelt R. P. "Software Piracy: An
assume that ethics has no role in economic behavior. That Analysis of Protection Strategies," Management Science,
is, ethics should have no effect on the formation of soft- Volume 37, Number 2, February 1991, pp. 125-139.
ware clubs. However, our findings suggest that ethical
levels have a significant effect on club size. As noted by DeJoie, R.; Fowler, G.; and Paradice, D. Ethical Issues in
Reilly and Kyj, "classical economic thought advocates a Information Systems. Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western
non-ethical decision-making context and is not functional Publishing Company, 1991.
for a modern complex, interdependent environment" (1990,
p. 691). Eining, M. M., and Christensen, A. L. "A Psycho-Social
Model of Software Piracy: The Development and Test of a
We agree and suggest that further integration of diverse Model." In R. DeJoie, G. Fowler, and D. Paradice (Edi-
fields will result in more realistic research models. tors), Ethical /,sues in Information Systems. Cincinnati,
Ohio: South-Western Publishing Company, 1991,
pp. 182-189.
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